Academics and donors have increasingly argued that African states can enhance their general administrative capacity by improving tax revenue collection. Proponents argue that administratively demanding improvements in tax administration may spillover to other areas of public administration by introducing improved practices, necessitating improvements elsewhere and providing data for other government activities. We make the first effort to test this hypothesis empirically, using an improved cross-country data set for sub-Saharan Africa. We find some evidence that from 1973 until the late 1990s improvements in tax administration tended to precede broader administrative improvements, consistent with the research hypothesis. By contrast, we find no evidence of such a pattern over the past decade. We conclude that these results provide tentative support for the hypothesis that improvements in tax collection can be a catalyst for broader gains in state capacity, but that such linkages are not guaranteed and depend on the particular character of reform.
Points for practitioners
Those involved with public administrative reform efforts have long been confronted with the question of whether reform is, or should be, an essentially system-wide process, or focused on developing 'pockets of effectiveness'. This debate is particularly relevant to tax reform: a growing academic literature has argued that tax reform can be a catalyst for system-wide change, but the dominant reform model has focused on the creation of autonomous revenue agencies to achieve rapid but focused capacity gains. This research examines the case for believing that tax reform can be a catalyst for broader reform, and thus the case for adopting a reform model that focuses more explicitly on system-wide change.
Introduction
Academics and donors have increasingly argued that African states can enhance their administrative capacity by improving tax revenue collection, and particularly the collection of more administratively demanding taxes (Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Brautigam, 2008; DFID, 2009) . 2 The logic of this prediction is straightforward: The collection of taxes is among the most administratively demanding functions of the state and relies heavily on information sharing and cooperation across government agencies. As such, improvements in tax collection may both necessitate and facilitate broader improvements in public administration.
Yet, while persuasive, there are good reasons to be sceptical of the belief that improvements in one area of administration will necessarily 'spillover' more broadly. In particular, this theory conflicts with a well developed line of research that proposes that 'pockets' of effectiveness (or excellence or productivity) are likely to exist even in the public administrations of states that are generally known for poor governance (e.g., White, 1954 White, , 1958 Lundgren and Fischer, 1975; Daland, 1981; Leonard, 1991 Leonard, , 2008 Grosh, 1991; Schneider, 1991; Grindle, 1997; Strauss, 1998) . The 'pockets of effectiveness' hypothesis implies that different areas of public administration often function in relative isolation from one another, with outcomes in one area frequently not reflected elsewhere. If this is true, improvements in tax administration may persist over long periods of time without being reflected in the broader quality of public administration.
In this article we explore both the extent and limits of the evidence for the claim that improved tax collection can be a driver of broader improvements in public administration. Despite the recent attention received by this hypothesis, there exists precious little contemporary evidence from either qualitative or quantitative sources, and this study thus represents a first effort to empirically test the claim across countries using quantitative methods. While the available techniques and data are admittedly imperfect, and future work is surely needed, we believe that this analysis provides an important step forward in our empirical understanding of this question.
Our broad approach to the quantitative analysis is to emphasize simplicity and intuitiveness, while being very clear about the limitations of the data, the available econometric methods and the specification of the model. This approach reflects a broader acknowledgement of the imperfections of cross-country tax and governance data, as well as the more general risks inherent in econometric analysis of complex political science questions using relatively small datasets (Beck and Katz, 1995; Beck, 2001; Wilson and Butler, 2007) . While these limitations are significant, we maintain that this type of study remains valuable, as it minimally provides a clear analytical reference point and check on the plausibility of existing hypotheses.
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This, in turn, immediately advances our understanding of the research question and provides valuable context for future research.
3 Ultimately, our findings are mixed, suggesting the existence of a weak, but nonetheless significant, historical relationship between improvements in tax administration and broader improvements in state capacity. Slightly more tentatively, the analysis suggests the existence of a structural break in the data over the past decade, with improvements in tax performance no longer matched by broader improvements in public administration. In broadest terms, the findings suggest that improvements in tax performance can be a catalyst for broader improvements in public administration, but that such benefits are far from guaranteed and may be dependent on the particular characteristics of tax reform programs.
The theoretical proposition
The hypothesis that a state that relies on domestically generated sources of income will have greater administrative capacity derives primarily from compelling historical evidence, largely from Europe. Minimally, dependence on domestic taxes demands that the state be able to place effective agents in the far corners of the society (Tilly, 1990) . Thus a state with such a fiscal base must have proto-state administrative capacity. This logic is all the more powerful for states that rely on relatively complex forms of taxation, which not only demand state presence, but also the ability to monitor the economic activities of taxpayers.
Beyond this minimal relationship, Brautigam (2008) and others have argued that improvements in tax revenue collection may spur much broader improvements in state administrative capacity. The most well documented, and persuasive, example comes from seventeenth and eighteenth century England. Brewer (1989) argues that, faced with the need for enhanced revenue collection, the British Excise Office introduced new norms of meritocracy, professionalism and training that became the model for public administration in the country and expanded demand for skilled bureaucrats. He further argues that collecting taxes both necessitated and stimulated the strengthening of other aspects of public administration. For example, the collection of data on imports and exports provided stimulus to economic planning, while the need for income taxation necessitated government engagement with different economic sectors and activities.
The work of Brewer and others points towards four mechanisms linking tax collection and broader state capacity. First, reforms in tax administration may include administrative innovations, such as increased meritocracy or improved internal monitoring, which subsequently spread throughout the civil service. Second, tax administrative reform may generate pressure for improvements in related agencies essential to tax collection, such as business registration, foreign investment promotion and land registration. Third, the desire to expand tax collection may require an enhanced government presence in remote areas, thus also expanding the reach of government services. And, fourth, the collection of tax revenue may generate data and information that is essential to other government activities, such as economic planning, business promotion or service targeting.
The basic logic of this hypothesis is sufficiently persuasive that a number of scholars have, in fact, chosen to use tax performance as a direct indicator of broader state capacity (Lieberman, 2002; Leonard and Straus, 2003; ArbetmanRabinowitz and Johnson, 2007) . But, even if taxation is an effective indicator of state capacity, this does not tell us whether taxation has been the cause of broader improvements in public administration.
Unfortunately, there is little existing evidence on the question of taxation as a cause of broader changes in state capacity. The most notable exception is the work of Kiren Chaudhry (1997) , who studied the implications of sharply declining levels of taxation in Saudi Arabia and Yemen after they gained access to large non-tax revenues. She concludes that declining tax collection led to a sharp decline in broader state capacity, explaining, for Saudi Arabia, that, 'With the decline of DZIT [the tax administration], the only method for collecting data on the economy was the use of contracts for government projects and customs statistics. Other forms of independent verification and information gathering atrophied, and massive projects were initiated [by the Ministry of Finance] and carried out in a blind frenzy of state spending ' (p. 125) . Beyond this work the bulk of evidence is either anecdotal or residual to research on related questions about taxation (see Prichard, 2010 for a summary of some such evidence).
Thus, we are left with a persuasive theoretical claim, which is supported by historical examples, but for which there is precious little contemporary evidence. This lack of evidence is significant, as the alternative possibility, that improved tax collection and administration may not be particularly likely to 'spill over' to other areas of public administration, is also highly plausible. This possibility follows the basic logic of the 'pockets of effectiveness' hypothesis: Different areas of public administration may be sufficiently distinct and disconnected from one another that improvements in one area are not directly relevant to what happens elsewhere. Indeed, the fact that levels of revenue collection tend to be remarkably stable within countries over time, largely irrespective of broader changes in the political, economic and administrative environment (Lieberman, 2002) , would seem to be somewhat at odds with the belief that changes in taxation are regularly the driver of broader changes.
In fact, the possibility that tax collection may be relatively independent of other administrative functions is explicitly reflected in the widespread creation of SemiAutonomous Revenue Authorities (SARAs) in developing countries over the past two decades (Fjeldstad and Moore, 2009 ). These revenue authorities operate like traditional revenue agencies, but have, in general, been granted substantial autonomy from the rest of the civil service with respect to decision making, salaries, hiring and firing, all with a view to facilitating rapid increases in the effectiveness of tax collection efforts. The implicit basis for such a model is the belief that a particular area of administration can be insulated from the realities of the broader civil service, in order to accelerate reform. If such a model is expected to prevent
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The econometric model
Econometric tests are, in principle, a highly attractive strategy for addressing this question, as the research hypothesis yields clear predictions about the relationship between taxation and state capacity over time and across countries. That said, while econometric tests are appealing in principle, such tests face major methodological challenges in practice. What follows introduces the basic model, and its limitations, so as to appropriately contextualize the findings, which are presented in the next section. The analysis revolves around a relatively simple econometric model, which predicts that the quality of public administration will be a function of the quality of tax administration, the level of national GDP and a series of control variables. In order to establish causality, we rely on the use of a lagged specification in which the quality of public administration today is a function of the quality of tax administration in an earlier period, thus capturing the temporal logic of positive spillovers over time from tax administration to broader state capacity.
This approach is the best option available for establishing causality but is also inherently imperfect, as it rests on two relatively strong assumptions. First, if changes in taxation are the causal variable then they will precede broader changes in public administration. Second, if changes in taxation preceded broader changes in state capacity then this is evidence of causality. We deem both assumptions to be sufficiently reasonable to justify their use, but also acknowledge their limitations. Finally, the use of a lag structure also requires an assumption about the appropriate lag length, and here we have little guidance from existing research. Ultimately, we expect that administrative changes are likely to occur over a period of several years, and thus report results using five-year lags, while thoroughly testing alternative lag structures for robustness.
Thus, in simplified form, the model that we employ is:
While this is a relatively simple model, it nonetheless poses significant challenges of implementation, owing, in particular, to the limitations of available data. We identify three problems in particular. First, existing cross-country tax datasets suffer from large amounts of missing data, significant inconsistencies across sources, and major differences in the way that tax data is recorded across countries, particularly with respect to resource rents. Second, available indicators of state capacity are highly imperfect. Third, there are legitimate, and unresolved, questions about how best to measure the quality of tax administration. These issues are addressed, in turn, below.
A more complete and reliable dataset
With respect to the available tax data, this study has gone to significant lengths, described only very briefly here, to increase the quality of the underlying data. While these efforts involve a degree of subjectivity and selectivity in drawing on multiple data sources, there is no doubt that the resultant data is far superior to that available from the standard data sources. 4 Moreover, while imperfect, such data adjustments are partially justified by the fact that they have, out of necessity, become common in similar studies.
5
We have assembled what we believe to be the most complete and accurate data set possible, based on publicly available information. 6 The resulting dataset covers 45 countries from 7 , and includes 1214 observations out of a theoretical potential of 1530. In practice coverage is much more complete than these aggregates suggest, as the majority of the missing data is from countries that did not begin reporting data until later than 1972, 8 or for which 2005 data is not available. After excluding these two issues, total coverage is 1146 out of 1236 possible observations.
Aside from increasing data coverage, the new dataset dramatically improves the reliability and accuracy of the underlying data. Given the fact that there are often discrepancies between different international data sources, the process of drawing on multiple sources highlights, and allows the removal of, obviously implausible data points within individual datasets. While such subjectivity is less than ideal, it is preferable to the implicit subjectivity implied by relying on a single dataset that includes clearly problematic data.
More importantly, our dataset addresses the problem of differences across countries in the way that natural resource revenues are recorded. Specifically, in existing datasets countries differ in whether they record such revenues as tax revenue or as non-tax revenue. By drawing on multiple data sources, and primarily data from IMF country reports, we are able to ensure that natural resource revenue is consistently recorded as non-tax revenue. This adjustment is particularly important, as the collection of natural resource revenues does not require the same administrative sophistication as other types of tax collection, and thus is not expected to directly contribute to broader gains in state capacity.
State capacity variables
Defining state capacity is a complex, and sometimes contentious, issue. The tersest definition of state capacity we have encountered is that of Besley and Persson (2009: 2) -'the state's ability to implement a range of policies'. Many more complex definitions have been offered (e.g., Midgal et al., 1994) -and have their merits -but this simple one is sufficient for our purposes. We find much more uniformity when we turn to attempts to operationalize the concept of state capacity for cross-national research. Here scholars generally use either the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) bureaucracy indicator (see, for example, Brautigam and Knack, 2004) or the Government Effectiveness measure from the World Bank's Governance indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2009) .
Despite their widespread use, both indicators face significant limitations. Most fundamentally, both are ultimately reliant on the opinions of country experts. They are thus inherently subjective and imprecise, and may reflect the biases of both the country experts who establish the rankings and the primary consumers of the indicators. More precisely, Williams and Siddique (2008: 137) argue that these indicators are likely to have a pro-business bias, as the ICRG in particular is largely compiled by, and for the use of, international corporations. This accusation is plausible, but if 'state administrative capacity' is a general attribute of a country then the way it administers business affairs should tell us a good deal about its capacity on other matters as well.
There is also a risk of contamination when using the quality of tax administration to explain the quality of broader public administration, as the effectiveness of the tax authority forms part of the broader state capacity measures. This is explicit in the case of the World Bank Government Effectiveness indicator, which includes, among a wide array of underlying variables, the 'capacity of the tax administration to implement measures decided on' (Kaufmann et al., 2009 ). The fact that our independent variable is partially constitutive of our dependent variable makes a contemporaneous correlation between the two extremely likely. Yet, this does not appear to pose a major risk to our causal model, which relies on the use of a lag structure, and is thus interested in changes in the broader quality of public administration that occur subsequent to changes in tax administration. While improved tax administration is likely, almost by definition, to improve contemporaneous measures of overall state capacity, it seems safe to attribute subsequent changes in our state capacity measures to broader administrative processes. Moreover, when we econometrically test the relationship between taxation and the ICRG indicator we find that while there is a strong overall correlation between the two variables, they do not, in fact, move closely together over shorter time periods.
Finally, the available governance measures come with an inescapable practical cost, as they shrink the sample size substantially. The ICRG indicator is available for only 31 countries beginning in 1983, and thus reduces the sample size by roughly half, though most of the excluded values are from island and small nations. 9 The World Bank (WB) indicator is available for all 47 countries, but only beginning in 1996, which leaves only a very short time series.
Ultimately, we recognize the imperfections inherent in these data sources, but follow many earlier studies in judging these to be acceptable limitations in the absence of viable alternatives (Williams and Siddique, 2008) . In what follows we rely exclusively on the ICRG indicator, as the World Bank indicators do not provide a sufficiently long time series for our purposes, while robustness tests using the WB indicators provide no evidence to call the results reported here into question.
Choosing a tax variable
We face an equally vexing challenge in selecting a tax variable. We are ultimately interested in measuring the quality of tax administration, but there are no available measures of the quality of tax administration across countries with a long enough time series to fit our analysis.
10 Thus we are forced to rely on levels of tax collection as a proxy for the quality of tax administration. This reliance, while unavoidable, raises two important questions: What types of taxes should be included, and is the level of tax collection actually an effective indicator of the quality of tax administration?
With respect to tax types, some authors have argued for a focus on income taxation (including personal, corporate and other small taxes on income), due its high level of administrative complexity (Weller and Ziegler, 2008) . Yet this focus is open to question, as the level of income tax collection may not be a better indicator of administrative quality than total tax collection. Many would argue that the VAT and other sales taxes can be equally administratively demanding, and there is no doubt that, in practice, the sophistication of VAT administration is higher than that of income tax collection in many developing countries.
11 To some degree this would seem to reflect the fact that while income taxes may be more demanding in principle, VAT administration has often gained greater attention in practice. At a general level the administrative sophistication required for income tax and VAT collection depends to a large degree on who is being taxed, and particularly on the breadth of the tax base, and this varies significantly across countries. Even trade taxes, while in general administratively easier to collect, may be important for creating positive spillovers to other areas of administration. To take two examples, customs administration often has the most significant reach into remote areas and has often been relatively heavily reliant on IT systems. The point here is not to reject the administrative centrality of income taxes in general, but to acknowledge that tax collection as a whole may be an equally useful indicator of administrative quality in low-income countries.
The second issue in selecting a tax variable lies in deciding whether levels of tax collection are the most appropriate proxy for the strength of tax administration. In practice, relying on levels of tax collection as a share of GDP is likely to be problematic because the level of tax collection is dependent not only on the quality of tax administration, but also on the nature of the economic activities being taxed. Thus the tax share of GDP may tell us as much about differences between economies as about differences in the quality of tax administration. In general, tax collection increases as incomes rise and as the share of trade in economic activity increases, owing largely to the increasing formalization of economic activity and the consequently greater ease of tax assessment. More generally, some forms of economic activity, such as large-scale manufacturing, are relatively easy to tax, while high levels of tax evasion characterize other activities, such as selfemployment.
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As a result tax experts have traditionally sought to measure the quality of tax administration through reliance on so-called 'tax-effort' studies, rather than relying on simple measures of revenue as a share of GDP. These studies estimate the performance of tax authorities by comparing actual levels of tax collection to predicted levels of collection, based on underlying economic variables (see Gupta, 2007 for a review of such studies). While 'tax effort' scores are intended to measure the overall performance of tax authorities, rather than the quality of administration per se, these tax effort measures are the closest available approximation of our concept of interest, and far preferable to simple tax to GDP ratios.
Given these considerations, we opt to run our econometric tests using tax effort scores as our measure of the quality of tax administration, rather than relying on simple tax ratios, which, as expected, yielded consistently statistically insignificant results during robustness testing. The tax effort indicators are derived by a) regressing tax revenue on a series of predictor variables, b) calculating a predicted value for each observation and c) dividing the actual level of collection by the predicted value. We rely on an extremely simplified tax effort model, which includes only the most widely accepted variables 12 , but are nonetheless relatively confident in the scores that we employ. While the calculation of tax effort scores faces important econometric and conceptual challenges (Therkildsen, 2001; Gupta, 2007) , country scores are relatively stable when using different specifications.
We ultimately test two different tax effort variables, one based exclusively on income tax revenue, the other based on total revenue collection. The decision to test both is driven by two considerations. First, as noted earlier, there is reason to believe that in low-income countries taxes other than income taxes might be of significant relevance to the emergence of capacity spillovers to general public administration. Second, on a more technical note, there is a long literature studying total tax effort ('taxeff') across countries, whereas we have never seen a tax effort study looking exclusively at income taxation ('taxeffinc'). Thus including the more conventional measure is a check on our approach, while such caution appears justified by the fact that the income tax effort scores have a much wider dispersion than the basic tax effort scores.
Control variables
The most important control variable that we employ is for civil conflicts ('majcivwarfrn'), 13 for which we draw on data from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) (Gleditsch et al., 2002) . We use the PRIO dataset to extend Fearon and Laitin's original data, and then derive a second variable for major civil wars, on the suspicion that it is only the latter that will significantly undermine state capacity and revenue collection. Our tests confirm that major civil conflicts are, indeed, of much greater significance for our purposes, and the results below report only this variable.
We also include controls for regime type, based on the Polity IV dataset, and log of GDP. While a case could be made in principle for including others, the inclusion
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of even these clearly important variables has a generally modest impact on our core conclusions, suggesting that the relatively simple specifications tested here are sufficient to capture the relationship of interest effectively.
Does state reliance on tax revenue spur general improvements in administrative capacity?
In order to test our model we attempt two alternative econometric approaches, both of which are commonly used for testing similar relationships using time-series cross-sectional data. The first approach is to rely on a fixed effects model with panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs), while employing a Prais-Winsten regression to account for serial correlation. The second approach seeks to model the serial correlation in the data directly by including a lagged version of the dependent variable as an explanatory term, while running a simple OLS regression with fixed-effects and PCSEs (Beck and Katz, 1995; Beck, 2001 ). In the second (dynamic) case the basic model becomes:
We test both models using five-year lags of the tax variables, along with the standard controls for log GDP and regime type. We also control for the impact of major conflict, for which we include dummy variables for each of the five years by which the tax variables are lagged.
The results are reported in Table 1 , and we find a positive and statistically significant relationship (Table 1 ). The tax variables are positive and achieve statistical significance at conventional levels in three of the four models tested. Both of the tests using a lagged dependent variable model yield statistically significant results, while the results using the Prais-Winsten model follow the same pattern, but achieve statistical significance only when using the total tax effort variable.
Turning to the choice of tax variables, it is the total tax effort variable that yields somewhat more strongly positive and significant results than the income tax effort variable. This is contrary to the expectation in some circles that administratively demanding income tax collection will be most relevant to broader state capacity. It would seem to reflect the importance and the administrative sophistication of both goods and services and trade taxes in sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere in the developing world.
Turning to the control variables, the log of per capita GDP has a statistically significant positive effect on the quality of public administration across the different models, as expected. More democratic regimes have statistically significantly lower scores on the state capacity indicators. This is counterintuitive, but the magnitude of the effect is small -a move from total dictatorship to full democracy implies only an approximately half point change in the ICRG scale. Finally, major conflicts
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International Review of Administrative Sciences 76 (4) have, as expected, a negative impact on levels of state capacity, though the inclusion of the conflict variables has no significant effect on the overall pattern of results. The overall picture is thus of a significant and positive relationship between taxation and improvements in broader state capacity. Challenges related to Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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model specification, and the imperfection of available indicators, argue for modesty in drawing overly strong conclusions from the results. However, we believe that this paper provides strong econometric support to the hypothesis that taxation can be a catalyst for broader gains in state capacity, though further research is certainly needed. At a minimum, these results illustrate that the underlying statistical reality is consistent with the hypothesis linking taxation to greater state capacity, which is itself an important finding.
Testing for robustness
To a large degree robustness testing has been implicit in the core results reported so far, as we have tested two alternative models and independent variables. Our primary additional robustness tests focus on the questions of lag length and outliers. With respect to the length of the lag on the tax variables, we initially opted for the use of a five year lag owing to the expectation that administrative spillovers would occur relatively slowly. We subsequently tested multiple alternative lag lengths using both econometric models in order to verify the robustness of our results. Table 2 reports the results using lagged dependent variables and lag lengths of one, three, five, seven and ten years. Though not reported here, the pattern of results using the Prais-Winsten model is virtually identical, though at slightly lower levels of significance in all cases. The findings are precisely as we would predict, as the results are most positive using five or seven years lags, and less positive, or not positive at all with one, three and ten year lags. The fact that the results are weakest when using a one year lag, and then become progressively stronger as the lag length is increased, is entirely consistent with the expectation or gradual administrative spillovers over several years. The fact that the significance of the connection weakens slightly beyond seven years is not at all troubling, as such a long lag opens the possibility of myriad intervening factors that may overwhelm the effect of tax administration on broader administrative changes. On balance, then, our robustness tests not only confirm the robustness of the results, but actually strengthen our confidence in our initial positive conclusion, as alternative lag lengths yield a highly consistent pattern overall.
Turning to the possibility of outliers shaping the results, we attempted two broad sets of robustness tests. First, we experimented with omitting highly resource dependent states, among which the case of greatest concern was Botswana, which collects low levels of tax revenue despite a relatively high level of state capacity. Excluding these countries does not change the overall pattern of results. Second, we have experimented with excluding any observations that appeared to be major outliers in the data, most notably Zimbabwe, Sudan, Eritrea and Mauritius. In all cases the results remained broadly similar when exceptional cases were excluded, with significance levels and magnitudes changing in degree rather than in kind. Prichard and Leonard 665 Table 2 . Continued
(8) Note: These regressions also included a full battery of dummy variables for major conflicts, as in the earlier results, but those variables are not presented here for the sake of clarity.
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Having established the contours of the relationship between taxation and broader state capacity over 34 years, our final interest was in confirming whether the relationship between our key variables has been consistent over time. In investigating this question, we uncovered evidence that there is a structural break in the data in the mid-1990s, and we decisively confirmed the existence of such a break using a simple Chow test. Tables 3 and 4 thus present the results of re-running Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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the earlier econometric tests on two separate samples, the first relying on base years 1972-96 and the second 1997-2005 . In all of the tests presented here we rely on a five year lag on the tax variables, with Table 3 presenting the results using a PraisWinsten and fixed effects model and Table 4 presenting the lagged dependent variable model. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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International Review of Administrative Sciences 76 (4) The results detail the nature of the structural break that was confirmed by the Chow test. Using the data until 1996 the results are slightly more strongly positive and significant than the results when using the full sample, with all four tests yielding positive and statistically significant results. By contrast, all of the tests using the data from 1997 onward are either statistically insignificant or, in one case, show a negative and statistically significant relationship.
Thus, we are confronted with the challenge of accounting for the apparent disappearance of the positive relationship after 1996. Unfortunately, the data provides no obvious answers, and a more detailed investigation of this question is beyond the scope of this paper. That said, the most intuitive and interesting explanation for such a break in the data is that something fundamental about the nature of tax administration, collection or reform has changed.
Since the early 1990s, 14 international donors in particular appear to have placed a growing emphasis on tax reform in sub-Saharan Africa, and have had a substantial impact on the character of tax policy and the structure of tax administration (Fjeldstad and Moore, 2009 ). This stands in at least partial contrast to the earlier period during which tax reform in the region does not appear to have been given special attention, but formed part of broader civil service reform efforts. The most dramatic expression of the growing attention given to tax reform as a discreet priority has been the creation of Semi-Autonomous Revenue Agencies (SARAs).
15 These reform programs have explicitly sought to isolate tax administration from the rest of the civil service in order to improve performance by reducing political interference, improving conditions of work and liberalizing personnel decisions (Devas et al. 2001; Kidd and Crandall, 2006; Fjeldstad and Moore, 2009) .
Such a relatively narrow focus on improving tax administration stands at least partially in contrast to alternative approaches to tax reform that specifically stress the importance of inter-governmental linkages and system-wide capacity improvements in order to improve information sharing and taxpayer monitoring (Prichard, 2010) . 16 This raises the possibility that the increasingly specific focus on improving tax administration has contributed to administrative fragmentation; thus, recent improvements in tax administration may have been largely isolated from broader administrative developments, whereas more holistic approaches in earlier years made positive spillovers more likely. This is not an entirely new idea, as Devas, Delay and Hubbard (2001) have proposed the possibility that the creation of separate rules and institutional arrangements for reforming tax administration may even have undermined efforts to achieve broader based civil service reform.
Unfortunately, while grounded in existing literature on tax reform in the region, this possibility is extremely difficult to test, as the particular character of tax reform efforts is effectively unquantifiable. One plausible option is to test the relatively more specific question of whether countries that have introduced SARAs have been particularly subject to a weakening of the relationship between tax administration and broader state capacity. Unfortunately, such an approach, while attractive on the surface, is theoretically flawed, as the emergence of tax reform as an increasingly isolated and specialized activity both pre-dates and extends beyond the narrow question of SARAs. While we nonetheless attempted to test the impact of SARAs by re-running our econometric tests while including a dummy variable for all country-years in which SARAs were in place, the results are, unsurprisingly, insignificant and ambiguous. Thus while our contention that the changing character of tax reform may explain the structural break in the data remains speculative, we feel strongly that this is an important subject for future research.
Conclusions
In this paper we have asked whether improvements in tax collection by African states tend to significantly influence the broader strength of administrative capacity. Our results have pointed towards a positive and significant relationship between taxation and broader improvements in state capacity.
We have noted multiple reasons for modesty in drawing strong conclusions, particularly with respect to the weaknesses of available data and the limitations of available econometric models. That said, we believe that the results presented here do allow for two important conclusions. First, there is enough evidence to strengthen our confidence in existing claims that strong tax administration can be a spur for broader improvements in administrative capacity. Even if one is sceptical of making strong causal claims on the basis of the imperfect data available to us, the analysis here minimally confirms that available empirical data is consistent with the research hypothesis. This alone is an important finding and justifies further research and policy attention.
Second, the results suggest that the relationship between taxation and broader state capacity is not universal or automatic. The uncertainty of these linkages is highlighted by the final set of results, which identify a significant structural break in the data during the 1990s, after which there is no longer any evidence of a positive relationship between taxation and broader state capacity gains. While speculative, and warranting much greater research, there is reason to believe that the changing character of tax reform strategies over time may have played a role in this changing relationship. The implication is that if reformers have a desire to foster broader administrative gains, there is a need to consciously focus attention on developing reform strategies that are likely to maximize such positive linkages.
Stepping back, we have thus provided evidence that taxation can be important to broader administrative capacity, but also that capacity gains in one area are by no means guaranteed to carry over elsewhere. The system-wide administrative attributes of early modern Europe thus appear important, but ultimately less dominant in present-day Africa. This finding is perhaps not terribly surprising: taxation was a powerful spur for broader administrative gains in early modern Europe because it imposed the need for basic literacy, meritocracy and bureaucratic organization. By contrast, basic literacy and bureaucratic organization within public administration is already a given in contemporary low-income countries.
7. This excludes Somalia, for which no revenue data is available for any periods, and Togo, for which data needed to be entirely excluded because it has so far been impossible to credibly separate resource rents from reported income tax revenue (this is discussed further later). 8. This is largely, though not exclusively, because many countries achieved independence later than 1972, including Eritrea, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, among others 9. The countries excluded by the ICRG data are: Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Lesotho, Mauritania, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sao Tome, Seychelles and Swaziland. Most of the lost data could arguably have been excluded on theoretical grounds: five of the countries are small islands, Eritrea is only recently independent, Djibouti and Equatorial Guinea both fall below the 1 million population threshold frequently employed in quantitative studies and Lesotho and Swaziland have populations only slightly above 1 million and are partly dependent on South Africa for tax collection.
In the preliminary models presented later the introduction of differenced variables further reduces sample sizes, as the first ICRG or WB observation is necessarily dropped. By contrast, lags on the tax variables generally do not cause any further data loss as tax data precedes the ICRG and WB data in any case. 10. The World Bank's 'Country Policy and Institutional Assessment' (CPIA) includes a question on the quality of tax administration, but data is only available beginning in 1999, while the measures are also likely to be highly subjective (Knack, 2009 ). 11. For example, the introduction of the VAT in many countries was accompanied by new IT systems, which only reached income tax administration significantly later. To take one example, an IT system for VAT administration was introduced in 1999 in Ghana, while the Internal Revenue Service was still not fully computerized as of 2009. 12. We employ a simple tax effort model, in which tax revenue is explained by GDP per capita and the share of trade in GDP, both of which reflect the level of formality of economic activity, and thus the relative difficulty of assessing taxes. These two variables, along with agricultural share and the level of non-tax revenue (often with mineral and fuel exports as proxies) are the only variables that are consistently significant across a large number of studies of this type. We exclude agricultural share because it is highly collinear with GDP, and most recent studies include only one of the two variables in any individual specification. We exclude non-tax revenue because we are interested in how much tax a country collects relative to its potential, whereas the inclusion of the non-tax variable tells us how much a country collects relative to what we would expect, given that resource rich countries often choose to collect less tax. 13. Interstate wars have historically been a major motivation for increased tax collection in most parts of the world, but major interstate wars have not been an important part of African history since independence, with the exception of Eritrea and Ethiopia in the early 1990s, and that case does not affect the results significantly. 14. Because we rely on a model employing lags, the base year 1997 relies on tax data from 1992. Thus, any such explanation for the break in the data must account for changes in tax administration, collection or reform that date to the early 1990s. 15. Fjeldstad and Moore (2009) report that there are 14 such revenue authorities in subSaharan Africa, which represents almost half of the ICRG sample. 16. For example, a proposed tax reform in Ghana, which has been stalled for several years, is largely based on the need to simultaneously build capacity within the tax 672 International Review of Administrative Sciences 76(4) administration, the Registrar General's office and the various agencies that manage land. Tax reformers further emphasize the need to build stronger links to the Department of Motor Vehicle Registration, and between the federal and local governments. While proponents of the ARA model would almost certainly also embrace these measures, in practice the narrow reform agenda appears to have taken precedence (Prichard, 2009 ).
